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IMPACTS OF bST ADOPTION WITH
ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT POLICIES
by
Donald Peterson
Extension Farm
Management Specialist
The development of synthetically
produced bovine Somatotropin (bST) as a
technique to boost milk production has
produced much controversy. Most of this has
been in the scientific and political arenas,
but not many economically sound statements
have been published. In December 1991,
Oklahoma State University published a
summary of an economic study conducted by
Derrell Peel.^ This article is a summary of
that publication.
Dr. Peel used a computer model to
simulate the impact of milk price support
programs on producers, consumers and the
taxpayer. The model assumes (1) the use of
bST would start in 1991, (2) cows treated
with bST will increase their annual produc
tion by 1320 pounds, (3) the cost of treat
ment is $0.30 per cow per day and cows are
treated 150 days per lactation, (4) feed
efficiency will improve 5%, (5) total feed
costs will increase per cow but decrease 5%
per hundred weight (cwt.) of milk and (6)
other variable costs will increase propor
tionally with milk production.
Four government policies were examined:
(1) Trigger Support System, (2) Fixed Price
Support System with a Dairy Termination
Program, (3) Quota System, and (4) Target
Price-Deficiency Payment System.
Trigger Support System
The trigger support program in the
model is very similar to what exists for
the dairy industry today. The support
price begins at $10.60 per cwt. of milk
sold and is adjusted downward whenever
government purchases exceed 5 billion
pounds, milk equivalent (ME).
The fixed support price holds the
price of milk at $10.60 and the USDA buys
(Continued on page 2)
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CATTLE AND HOG OUTLOOK
by
Gene Murra
Extension Livestock
Marketing Specialist
Fed and feeder cattle prices have been
relatively high in 1992, at least compared
to expectations. Meanwhile, hog prices
have been relatively low, at least compared
to last year and compared to the expecta
tions of the more optimistic forecasters.
Where are prices of these important South
Dakota commodities headed? While there are
no guarantees, there are some factors which
help answer that question.
Cattle
Reduced supplies of fed cattle have
helped keep prices above $75 and close to
$80 for most of early 1992. Tho se reduced
supplies are the result of lower placements
of cattle on feed during late 1991. While
the reduced supply situation won't change
overnight, recent placements of cattle on
feed point toward larger supplies by earlv
Summer. And, there seems to be enough
feeder cattle available for feeding to push
supplies even higher late in 1992.
Given the above situation, fed cattle
prices likely will slip a few dollars by
Summer (meaning prices in the mid-$70's
early and below $75 by late Summer). That
slippage could continue into the Fall, when
prices below $70 are not out of the
question.
If the fed cattle picture noted above
does indeed become reality, feeder cattle
prices also will move lower. It is highly
possible that the year's high for both fed
and feeder cattle is behind us.
One factor that could further affect
feeder cattle prices is the corn market.
Unfortunately for feeder cattle producers,
that affect likely will be to the down
side. If corn prices move higher for what
ever reason, feeder cattle prices will move
(Continued on page 4)
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all milk products which do not clear the
market at that price.
Quota System
The quota system gives the government
power to fix the number of cows allowed to
produce milk. If technology improves
-production per cow, the producer benefits,
but there would be price disincentives to
produce over the quota. If there is over
production in year 1, then the number of
cows is reduced in year 2. Adjustments
would be made by production region. There
fore, if the Pacific region increased
production, the number of cows in the
Pacific region must be reduced, but not
necessarily in other regions.
Dairv Termination Prop-ram
The dairy termination program assumes
another "one time" buy-out if government
purchases exceed 15 billion pounds in any
one year. The milk price support system
starts at $10.60 and is adjusted by a
trigger system if government purchases
exceed 5 billion pounds in the previous
year. Slaughtered dairy cows are added to
the non-fed beef supplies.
Target Price
The target price policy works similar
to the current wheat and corn programs.
Deficiency payments are made to producers
so that the market price plus the defi
ciency payment adds to the target price.
Thus, market price fluctuations allow the
market to clear all production.
RESULTS
With the exception of the deficiency
payment program, as the use of bST in
creases, government policy results in cuts
in the support price, dairy cow numbers, or
both, to keep annual purchases under 5
billion pounds, ME. This means that by
1998 total milk production will be only
slightly higher with bST than without bST,
but the farm price will be lower.
The implications of bST adoption
depends on the government policy in force
at the time of adoption. Production would
increase regardless of which program is in
force. However, the quota system results
in less milk produced relative to the other
programs and its rate of increase is the
most uniform, assuming no change in
political forces governing the quotas.
The fixed price support program
results in the fastest increase in milk
production although somewhat more erratic
than the quota system. The largest in
crease in production occurs in 1995 (about
the fifth year of production with bST).
The trigger policy, which is similar
to what we have now, results in production
increasing faster than with the quota sys
tem but slower than with the fixed price
support system and has the most erratic
fluctuations in production of the three.
The impact of the target price policy was
not reported but can be expected to be
similar to the fixed price support.
IMPACT ON THE GOVERNMENT TREASURY
The different government programs
which were studied have varying impacts in
the federal treasury. As would be expect
ed, the target price with deficiency pay
ments program is the most expensive. That
is followed by the fixed price program.
Both the trigger and the quota programs
result in lower government costs, but the
trigger program requires more time to
stabilize supply than does the quota
program.
An analysis was conducted to compare
the trigger program with the deficiency
payment program. The target price was set
at $10.60, the same as the price support.
Both programs achieve the same results.
However, the target price program is signi
ficantly more costly to the taxpayer and
only slightly cheaper to the consumer.
With the target price program, defi
ciency payments will range between $0.15 &
$1.52 per cwt., averaging $.75/cwt. from
1991 to 1998 or $1.44 billion annually.
This is 230% greater than maintaining a
fixed support price at $10.60.
The high cost results from the fact
that when there is over production of milk,
large reductions in price are necessary to
clear the market, resulting in large
deficiency payments. With the trigger
system, the consumers pay full price for
whatever is purchased, whereas with the
deficiency program, consumers pay only the
market clearing price. Also, with the
trigger system, prices are lowered to the
producer until production is cut back.
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CHANGES IN DEMAND
Although there is no scientific evi
dence to the contrary, the hype in the
popular press about health safety with bST
treated cows could result in a decreased
demand for dairy products. In the model, a
10% decline in the demand for milk causes
milk prices to fall as low as $8.60 by 1997
before starting to rise. By contrast, a
10% increase' in demand causes milk prices
to increase to over $14.00/cwt. for several
years before the industry expands enough to
meet the increased demand at $10.60/cwt.
With current government policy, the
industry responds about 3 times faster to
an increase in demand than a decrease. A
decrease in demand also results in annual
government expenditures of more than $1
billion through 1996.
A quota system brings supply in line
with demand at $10.60/cwt. more quickly
than other policies since quota allotments
would be adjusted by government decree.
The trigger policy eventually causes a
reduction in supply. However, this is
accomplished only with an extended delay
while the fixed support price system
maintains the highest level of milk
production.
Both the fixed support system and
quota system keep the farm price at
$10.60/cwt. The trigger and dairy termi
nation programs allow prices to migrate
downward under the weight of excessive
production. The trigger program allows
prices to fall to $8.60 by 1992, allowing a
buy-out that year. Thus, there is no need
to reduce the price support before 1993.
IMPACTS ON OTHER AG. SECTORS
With the adoption of bST there would
be a marginal increase in feed needed. How
ever, the mix of feeds would change to meet
revised nutritional requirements. The big
gest impact is on premium quality hay prices,
boosting average hay prices $1.25 to $2.50
per ton, depending on policy adopted.
Beef cattle are the most affected of
all livestock enterprises. While there
should be only small annual price impacts
on average, there can be substantial
impacts at the extremes. A dairy buy-out
program has the biggest impact on beef,
pushing 1992 yearling cattle about
$2.50/cwt. lo.wer when compared to a trigger
policy. Cow prices are nearly $4.00/cwt.
lower compared to a trigger policy. A
quota system impacts the beef industry
about the same as a dairy buy-out program,
but has a less negative impact in 1992
while lasting several years longer.
CONCLUSIONS
Except when a dairy buy-out program is
used as a means to control excess produc
tion, the adoption of bST by dairy produc
ers is not likely to have any significant
impact on other sectors of ag economy.
Government policies, designed to
maintain high prices for producers, also
maintain high prices for constimers. The
least beneficial to the consumer are the
quota and fixed price systems. The trigger
system allows some decline in milk prices
which should translate to lower prices for
dairy products. The most beneficial to
consumers is the target price with defi
ciency payments because it results in the
lowest dairy product prices. However, it
is the most costly to the taxpayer.
The least costly to the taxpayer is
the quota system, especially if there is a
severe decline in demand. The trigger and
fixed price systems lie somewhere between
the quota system and deficiency program as
far as the taxpayer is concerned.
Which producers survive as the number
of cows and dairy operations decrease is a
function of the policy in force during the
down sizing period. With a quota system in
place, some producers will survive by
virtue of the institutional arrangement
whereas the survival under the trigger
system will be determined primarily by
economic efficiency.
The choice of dairy program is likely
to be significantly influenced by the geo
graphical distribution of milk production.
The 1985 and 1990 farm bills have pushed
the dairy industry toward supply and demand
being controlled by market forces. However,
there are still many unresolved issues and
new issues are coming from environmental
and food safety forces which need to be
addressed.
^ Peel, Derrell, "Inpacts of bST Adoption Under Alternative
National Dairy Policies, Current Economics, Oklahoma
Agricultural Experiment Station, Deceofcer 1991.
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lower. Even at stable corn prices, feeder
cattle prices could be $10-$15 below year
earlier levels for most of 1992.
Hogs
Supply also has been a major player in
the hog market. There, larger supplies
than a year ago (up about 7% so far in
1992) have kept hog prices in the upper
$30's and low $40's. Supplies should be
lower by mid-Spring and prices could reach
the mid-$40's level, or even the upper
$40's for brief periods.
By late Summer, however, increased
supplies once again should pressure prices.
Late in 1991, prices slipped to the $37-38
area. Given that supplies late in 1992
likely will be slightly larger than those
in late 1991, prices once again could go
well below $40.
Final Comments
One might get the impression that
supply has been a key player for both
cattle and hogs thus far in 1992. That is
correct. Also, that same impression could
be the situation for the rest of 1992.
Again, that is correct.
Demand, while always important,
probably won't be much different in 1992
compared to 1991. Therefore, changes in
quantities supplied play the major role.
For both cattle and hogs, increases in
supply by this Fall are expected. If that
occurs, prices for fed cattle could be
below $70, feeder cattle prices could be
$10 to $15 or even more below 1991 levels,
and hog prices in the $30s are possible for
this Fall and even early in 1993.
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